PYONGYANG DECLARES WAR…. AGAIN
The Stuck Record of High Politics and North Korea
In the past few months, North Korea has launched a missile, tested its third nuke, and threatened nuclear war. And just like past ‘crises’, the rhetoric has cooled, there are renewed mentions of dialogue, Seoul is alive and well, and the media has moved on to other things until the next threat cycle. During this “crisis”, the world speculated on the seriousness of the North Korea’s threats in conjunction with the progression of their nuclear and missile programs, and the possibility of a second Korean war. Most analysts however, saw through the ruse, noting how unlikely the nightmare scenario really is.
Source: Reuters/KCNA
One such expert is Andrei Lankov, of Seoul’s Kookmin University.
“Moreover, there is almost nothing particularly unusual in the recent developments. In the last two decades, North Korea has on various occasions conducted highly provocative missile and nuclear tests and promised to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. Now it has declared its withdrawal from the 1953 armistice agreement that ended fighting in the Korean War but not the war itself. It has denounced American and South Korean military exercises as an act of war. And on Tuesday, North Korea told foreigners in the South to look for shelter or consider evacuating because the Korean Peninsula could soon be engulfed in nuclear war. This time, the tune is being played louder, but that is the only real change. A closer look at North Korean history reveals what Pyongyang’s leaders really want their near-farcical belligerence to achieve — a reminder to the world that North Korea exists, and an impression abroad that its leaders are irrational and unpredictable. The scary impressions are important to North Korea because for the last two decades its policy has been, above all, a brilliant exercise in diplomatic blackmail. And blackmail usually works better when the practitioners are seen as irrational and unpredictable.”
In judging the potential seriousness behind North Korea’s threats, they need to be taken in context. The severity of these threats look much less potent when one takes into account the cyclical nature of provocation and engagement, and the underlying interest of regime survival that guides the ruling elite’s decision making. Let’s take a look at some of these patterns via media excerpts from the past two decades.
Canceling the Armistice:
Source: AP
First up, the armistice. Excluding the many incidences and provocations that effectively violated the terms of the armistice, the actual document itself has been threatened six times on part of NK, starting in 1991. The symbolic value of the armistice as the document keeping peace and stability makes it the obvious target when ramping up tensions; a move that threatens war without necessarily needing to be accompanied by real action that could lead to instability. Here’s a few articles that perhaps make the most recent cancellation of the armistice look somewhat normal.
August 31, 1995:
The North Korean aim in undermining the armistice is largely to force a peace treaty with the United States, according to scholars, officials and North Korea’s own pronouncements. […] The American position is that North Korea should first work out a peace with South Korea. If both sides stick to their positions, so that there is neither an effective armistice nor a new peace treaty, then it would be more difficult to monitor the already strained cease-fire along the border, according to American and South Korean officials. Already, both sides regularly accuse the other of firing across the frontier, crossing the demarcation line, digging tunnels underneath the border or other violations. (NY Times)
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April 5, 1996:
The North said today that it would no longer carry out its duty under the armistice agreement “concerning maintenance and control” of the area. The statement, carried by the official Korean Central News Agency, added that the North Korean Army was taking “self-defensive measures” now that the zone would no longer be maintained. (NY Times)
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February 18, 2003:
“The K.P.A. side will be left with no option but to take a decisive step to abandon its commitment to implement the Armistice Agreement as a signatory to it and free itself from the binding force of all its provisions, regarding the possible sanctions to be taken by the U.S. side against the D.P.R.K.” (KPA Statement) “If the U.S. side continues violating and misusing the Armistice Agreement as it pleases, there will be no need for the D.P.R.K. to remain bound to the A.A. uncomfortably.” (KCNA)
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May 27, 2009:
“The Korean People’s Army will not be bound to the Armistice Agreement any longer since the present ruling quarters of the United States, keen on the moves to stifle the DPRK, plugged the south Korean puppets into the PSI at last, denying not only international law but the AA itself and discarding even its responsibility as a signatory to the agreement In case the AA loses its binding force, the Korean Peninsula is bound to immediately return to a state of war from a legal point of view and so our revolutionary armed forces will go over to corresponding military actions.” (KCNA)
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March 11, 2013:
The North Korean army has declared invalid the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953, the official newspaper of the country’s ruling Workers’ Party said Monday. Since last week, North Korea had been threatening to scrap the armistice after the U.N. Security Council passed tougher sanctions against it in response to its February 12 nuclear test. On Monday, the Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported that the Supreme Command of North Korea’s army had done so. “The U.S. has reduced the armistice agreement to a dead paper,” the newspaper said. (CNN)
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Sanctions:
Source AFP
Next up, sanctions. Each time sanctions are passed, there is another bout of speculation on whether or not the Chinese government will go along with them. There are estimates that say China alone is responsible for 90% of North Korea’s energy imports, 80% of North Korea’s consumer goods, and 45% of its food. This kind of economic relationship puts them in a position of power with determining the effectiveness of any sanctions, and in this situation, there is little evidence of a substantial policy shift from the past. China’s fundamental policy still favors the status quo, which entails that it doesn’t implement any policies that could lead to the instability of the North Korean regime. Despite repetitive claims that the latest round of sanctions will bite hard, the fundamentals have remained the same.
June 3, 1994:
The Administration’s move marked a new — and potentially dangerous — phase of Washington’s confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear program. North Korea has threatened to attack South Korea if sanctions are imposed (…) But even as the Administration vowed to seek sanctions, key elements of its plan remained unclear, including whether China would go along and what steps North Korea would have to take to end any sanctions that might be imposed. (NY Times)
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May 11, 2005:
Liu Jianchao, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, said Tuesday that China rejected suggestions that it should reduce oil or food shipments to North Korea, calling them part of its normal trade with its neighbor that should be separate from the nuclear problem. ”The normal trade flow should not be linked up with the nuclear issue,” he said. ”We oppose trying to address the problem through strong-arm tactics.” (NY Times)
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July 17, 2006:
“I think ultimately North Korea will have no choice but to return to the talks and pursue denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula,” Ms Rice told reporters in St Petersburg. “If they do not want to face some of the additional pressures that can be brought to bear on them, then I think that they will eventually realise that they’ve got to come back to the six-party talks.” (Independent)
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October 15, 2006:
The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously Saturday to slap North Korea with trade, travel and other sanctions as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test. President Bush described the U.N. action as a ‘swift and tough’ message that the world is ‘united in our determination to see to it that the Korean Peninsula is nuclear-weapons free’. (CNN)
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June 12, 2009:
Securing a unanimous resolution shows the extent of the anger within the Chinese government over last month’s nuclear test. Normally it is difficult for the US, Britain and France, all members of the security council, to persuade China and, to a lesser extent, Russia to take a tough line against North Korea.
The US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, described the resolution as ‘unprecedented’. She said that the sanctions regime has ‘teeth that will bite’. (Guardian)
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August 2, 2010:
“[Robert Einhorn:] Our hope is that these measures [sanctions] will be effective, that they will provide strong incentives for North Korea’s leaders to abide by their international obligations not to pursue any provocative activities and to fulfill completely their commitments to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” (CS Monitor)
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March 7, 2013:
The U.N. Security Council unanimously passed tougher sanctions against North Korea Thursday targeting the secretive nation’s nuclear program hours after Pyongyang threatened a possible ‘preemptive nuclear attack.’ ‘These sanctions will bite, and bite hard,’ U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice said after the vote. (CNN)
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March 25, 2013:
North Korea’s economy was “more linked to the outside world than many people realize” and it may be more susceptible to sanctions, especially if China was involved, than he had thought, he said.
“Given the increased threat from North Korea, increasing sanctions is worth a try. The Department of State and Treasury and the White House are working very closely together to see what more can be done,” he [US State Department Official] said. He said there was still scope to increase sanctions on North Korea. “I don’t know what will succeed, but we haven’t ‘maxed out’, there is headroom, and we have to give it a try,” he said” (Reuters)
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Threats of Destruction:
Source: AFP/KCNA
A few weeks ago, North Korea instructed foreigners in Seoul and Pyongyang to evacuate, and even threatened pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the US. While at first glance these threats may sound serious, even surface level analysis of recent history clearly show that nukes or not, North Korea is no stranger to over-the-top threats to cause destruction. Even excluding nuclear weapons, North Korea has threatened to use its conventional weapons to cause a “sea of fire” countless times since 1994.
March 8, 1994:
In an appearance of what will become a well-worn phrase, a North Korean negotiator threatens to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire.” Fearing war, South Koreans clear store shelves of instant noodles, water, gas and other necessities. (Independent)
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December 11, 1998:
“Once they are given an order by the respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Il, they will together with the Korean People’s Army turn the [enemy’s] strongholds, washington, Seoul and Tokyo into a sea of flame and achieve [historical] cause of national reunification, they said…” (KCNA)
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January 22, 1999:
North Korea has accused the United States and South Korea of preparing for nuclear war, and said it will turn both countries into a sea of fire if it is attacked. The South Korean president, Kim Dae-Jung has meanwhile warned his country to be ready for a surprise attack by the North. The BBC Seoul correspondent says that these are some of the strongest exchanges for some time between the two countries, and that they’re probably a bargaining ploy as talks continue in Geneva. (BBC)
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March 15, 2001:
“The U.S. imperialists’ brigandish “policy of strength” can never go down with the Korean people who value the dignity and [sovereignty] of the nation more than their life and soul. We are fully prepared for both dialogue and war. It is our determination to react to the enemy’s hardline stand with the toughest position and take thousandfold revenge on aggressors.” (KCNA)
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October 16, 2003:
“When an appropriate time comes, the DPRK will take a measure to open its nuclear deterrent to the public as a physical force and then there will be no need to have any more argument.” (KCNA)
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May 28th, 2009:
“It is the fixed will of the army and the people of the DPRK to wipe out the warmongers with a barrage of fire of the Songun army. The Songun army of the DPRK shows no mercy to the peace wreckers and the war provocateurs.” (KCNA)
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June 17, 2010:
“North Korea’s military threatened on June 12 that it will destroy South Korean propaganda loudspeakers along its border and may even turn Seoul into a “sea of flame,” in the strongest warning yet against Seoul’s plan to resume anti-Pyongyang broadcasts.” (Yonhap)
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November 28, 2010:
“The US aircraft carrier George Washington steamed into the Yellow Sea last night at the centre of a powerful naval strike force daring North Korea to make good on threats to turn the waters into ‘a sea of fire’.” (Independent)
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November 24, 2011:
“North Korea threatened Thursday to turn Seoul’s presidential palace office into a “sea of fire,” stepping up its rhetoric one day after South Korea conducted large-scale military drills near a front-line island attacked by North Korea last year.” (CBS)
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April 4, 2012:
“North Korea sharply escalated the rhetoric against its southern rival, claiming it would soon conduct “special actions” that would reduce South Korea’s conservative government to ashes within minutes.” (Independent)
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March 7, 2013:
“North Korea amplified its threatening rhetoric as the U.N. Security Council approved new sweeping sanctions, vowing to launch a first-strike nuclear attack against the United States and threatening to engulf Washington in a “sea of fire.” (Fox News)
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The State of Change:
Source: New Focus International
Of course, there are some differences between the most recent period of aggressive rhetoric and threat cycles of the past. There’s a new untested leader, the potentially permanent closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the progression of the nuclear program, and perhaps some signs of growing frustration in Beijing with regards to Pyongyang’s belligerence. However, the strategic interests of the same actors remain fundamentally unchanged, and today, the level of high politics is no closer to any solutions than it was twenty years ago.
If one were to simply peel back the layer of high politics to take a look at changes at the grassroots societal level in North Korea over the past twenty years, they’d see a whole different story. They’d see that ordinary North Koreans are more exposed than ever before to information from the outside, and that society is undergoing key changes that provide glimpses of hope for a positive transformation in the long term. Though the vast majority of international media coverage focuses on the high politics, this only produces the same story year after year. It’s clearer than ever that hope for change in this issue lies in the oft-ignored people, and bottom-up solutions.
CHRIS LAURON | Research and Strategy Intern
